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September 1, 2005. The traditional annual celebration of the “first
bell” takes place at the primary school of Sosnivka, a small coal-
mining town in Western Ukraine.[1] The first-grade students are
presenting a short performance. A tiny girl, Darynka, dressed in a
lacy skirt, a red jacket with a downy collar and a wrap-around braid
(borrowed by her grandmother from a beauty salon especially for the
occasion) comes to the front. She recites with special expression a
poem written by her female teacher:
To be Prime Minister is my aim,
I am already skilled in braiding.
Designer clothes will be mine,
I’ll master all that is taught![2]
Stormy applause. Darynka rings a little bell signifying that the school
year has begun. After the ceremony she finds herself encircled; every-
body wants to have a picture taken with this little copy of the great
Yulia. Darynka is happy: today she is almost as popular as her fam-
ous prototype.
One can hardly find another politician in Ukraine who produces
such a tremendous emotional reaction among citizens (either for or
against) as Yulia Tymoshenko. Indeed, Tymoshenko remains very
popular in Ukraine as the last parliamentary elections in March 2006
proved: her party’s bloc BYuTy won in 13 of 25 regions.[3] In Lviv just
before the elections one could observe ordinary people standing in
long queues to get a poster or a postcard portraying their idol. Por-
traits of her made out of amber are sold in fashionable gift shops
downtown. As one of the most recognizable symbols of Ukraine, a
number of souvenirs depicting Tymoshenko (matryoshka dolls, com-
mercial paintings, handcrafts, etc.) are sold at tourist places
.
Lviv city dwellers queuing up in front of the Tymoshenko’s electoral campaign tent; photo
by Oksana Kis, Lviv, March 24, 2006
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Souvenir matreshka dolls representing the “Orange Coalition”; photo by Oksana Kis, Lviv,
summer 2005
She has a fan club in the city of Vynnytsia, there is a statue of her in
the Museum of Wax Figures in Kyiv (along with one of Victor
Yushchenko), and a museum devoted to Yulia Tymosenko was con-
ceived of in Lviv last summer (which remains, however, in the plan-
ning stages). She always finds new ways to agreeably surprise people,
such as on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Orange Revolu-
tion on October 22, 2005 at Maydan Nezalezhnosti (Independence
Square) in Kyiv, when she did not mount the platform in the usual
way using the stairs, but the crowd brought her there on its hands – a
gesture meant to demonstrate that she is the only genuine leader with
the people’s support in Ukraine. Today it is hard to ignore the smiling
portraits of her in shop windows and business offices in Lviv. Many
people even have an image of Tymoshenko in their private apart-
ments. Indeed, she has found her way into peoples’ hearts. She is
popular in the true sense of the word.
How to explain this impressive success of a female politician who
has been in the opposition for most of her career? What is so special
about this woman? What are the reasons for her unusual popularity?
This article tries to deconstruct her political image in order to reveal
the secrets of Tymoshenko’s success.
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THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT
A short introduction to the post-Soviet gender order in Ukraine seems
to be essential in beginning such an analysis. When Ukraine became
an independent state in 1991, the new national leaders proclaimed
their intention to establish democratic governance and the develop-
ment of a civic society based on the principle of universal equality of
all Ukrainian citizens in their rights and opportunities. Over the last
fifteen years substantial changes have occurred in public and political
discourses, including in Ukrainian women’s consciousness. The
formerly imposed canon of femininity – the communist ideology of
the Soviet Superwoman – lost its monopoly and authority and was chal-
lenged and undermined by Ukrainian nationalism and consumerism.
The value system of the formerly forbidden ideology of Ukrainian
nationalism is deeply rooted in Ukrainian national history and folk
culture, so it naturally supports the revival of the traditional gender
order. So-called “Western patterns,” including such manifestations of
consumer culture as industries of beauty and fashion, were formerly
hidden from Soviets behind the “iron curtain.” Perceived as an in-
carnation of “real” Western freedom and genuine femininity, they at-
tracted Ukrainian women. The ideologies of nationalism and con-
sumerism have produced two predominant models of normative fem-
ininity, which can be labelled Berehynia and Barbie and correlate to
each other as national vs. cosmopolitan or as local vs. global versions
of femininity.[4]
Although the Berehynia image has a rather heterogeneous nature
representing a constellation of certain pagan beliefs, elements of mat-
riarchal myth, some Christian ideas,[5] popular folk motifs and fea-
tures of some characters in Ukrainian fiction, it pretends to be an em-
bodiment of a native femininity, enrooted in and arising from authen-
tic ancient Ukrainian history and national culture. As a single whole it
fits perfectly into the ideology and mythology of Ukrainian national-
ism, supporting a corresponding value system. The core elements of
the Berehynia image are self-sacrificial motherhood, Christianity and
devotion to the nation. It is also important that Berehynia has certain
matriarchal implications, which encourage a woman to be dominant,
competent and decisive but only within her proper domain of
competence.
The second image – that of Barbie – is closely associated with mar-
ket ideology and consumer culture. The Barbie doll remains one of
the most obvious symbols of globalization in post-Soviet countries.
The Barbie model derives not only from the doll that bears this name
but also from a lifestyle associated with it. Beautiful, sexy, charming,
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and correspondingly turned out, a “Barbie woman” is designed to at-
tain success as a pleasant, attractive toy for a man. For many, Barbie
embodies the ideal of heterosexual femininity today.
Unlike Berehynia, who is assigned mainly the (natural and cultur-
al) reproduction of the nation, Barbie’s body is an object of male aes-
thetic and erotic pleasure. In both cases, however, a woman is to serve
– either a man or a patriarchal nation-state. These two well-
established stereotypes of femininity impose on a Ukrainian female
politician a number of limitations and requirements to comply with in
order to be accepted by ordinary people and gain electoral support
among citizens. A woman interested in a political career in Ukraine is
expected to fulfil at least two roles: as Berehynia she has to become a
virtuous mother of her nation; as Barbie she must be a national sex
symbol.
CLIMBING THE POLITICAL MOUNT OLYMPUS
Yulia Tymoshenko’s life has not at all been easy. She is by no means
the Cinderella of Ukrainian politics; she did not get her chance from a
fairy godmother. Quite the opposite – her life story, as it is told in her
autobiography and other Tymoshenko’s biographies recently pub-
lished in Ukraine, proves her to be the single-handed designer, archi-
tect and builder of her destiny.[6] Indeed, she has come to be known
as an entirely self-made woman, steadily laying a path from poor pro-
vincial girl to prime minister and one of the most famous women in
the world. Let’s trace the changes she made to her image to survive
her ascent up the Ukrainian political Olympus.
Yulia was born in 1960 into an ordinary Soviet family in Dnipro-
petrovsk. She was the only child. Her father left them when she was a
little girl, so Yulia’s mother took several jobs in order to maintain the
family Thus from the young age Yulia learned that a woman must be
strong in order to survive. She knew there was nobody to draw her
out of poverty so she studied diligently at school and entered uni-
versity. In 1979 she met her husband Alexander and, despite their
very young age, soon married.[7] The next year she gave birth to their
daughter Eugenia. At the same time she continued her university
studies and graduated in 1984, working first as an engineer in a fact-
ory and then later starting up a small private business with her hus-
band. Owing to her expertise in economics and her strong character,
Yulia gained authority in business circles; she became an important
figure in her husband’s family business. In 1995 she headed the Un-
ited Energy Systems corporation – the richest and most influential
company on the market in energy resources in Ukraine (its yearly
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turnover then ran into the billions). At that time Tymoshenko was re-
garded as the protégé of Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko.[8]
In 1997 she was elected to the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian
Parliament) in a by-election; in 1998 she was elected as a people’s
deputy for the second time. Her career was developing headily. In
1999 she completed a doctoral thesis in economics and received the
degree of kandydat nauk. In the same year she was assigned the post of
Vice Prime Minister in the Yushchenko-headed government. But Ty-
moshenko was not satisfied with her success as an economist. In 1999
she founded and headed a party of her own, namely Bat’kivshchyna
(Fatherland). The party enjoyed some favor, and a few years later con-
stituted the core of political opposition to the Kuchma regime. That is
why a criminal case against her was fabricated and she was jailed for
42 days in 2001. Nevertheless, Tymoshenko did not give up or in, and
in 2001 she founded and led a coalition of parties bearing her name:
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuTy). The Bloc’s electoral campaign in
2002 was quite successful, and Yulia Tymoshenko became a member
of the Ukrainian Parliament for the third time.
Tymoshenko belongs to the central-right wing of Ukrainian polit-
ics, advocating liberal principles in market economy and promoting
the further democratization of Ukrainian society.[9] However, her de-
cisions as Prime Minister seemed to evidence more of a socialist ap-
proach to the state regulation of the national economy.[10] On the
other hand, Tymoshenko invariably represents herself as an opposi-
tional politician fighting a corrupted regime. Tymoshenko’s rhetoric
is always highly populist; when addressing a wider audience, she
constantly stresses her devotion to restoring social justice and to solv-
ing the most burning social issues. As Andrey Slivka has correctly re-
marked, “Tymoshenko’s statism and populism do have appeal in a
country in which even the young are not completely convinced of the
need to jettison the entirety of their socialist inheritance.”[11]
Tymoshenko’s alliance with Yushchenko during the 2004 presid-
ential campaign brought him a good many votes. Her role in the
Orange Revolution can hardly be overestimated. As a reward, the
new President, Yushchenko, assigned her to the post of Prime Minis-
ter in February 2005. She was discharged in September 2005. An ana-
lysis of the efficacy of her governance is not the purpose of this study.
Despite this failure, Tymoshenko has not been written out of the
Ukrainian political game; she is still a very respected player, and the
peculiarities of her play are of our special interest here.
In what follows I analyze how and to what measure Yulia Ty-
moshenko makes use of stereotypical female images. Tymoshenko is
different every time you see her. She looks different, she speaks
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differently, and she behaves differently depending upon the political
context, the particular situation and the audience being addressed.[12]
What is invariable in her behaviour is that she performs each role –
both Berehynia and Barbie – skilfully and with deep persuasion.
MOTHER OF THE NATION
Tymoshenko softly but steadily has promoted her image as Mother of
the Nation. In response to the question of who her political “father,”
“mother,’” “husband” and “children” are, Tymoshenko stated: “I
wish to join people who have the same goal as I do. That will be the
family.”[13] Elsewhere she develops this idea: “I perceive a woman in
the political realm as a mother who defends her children... Maybe at
first glance she looks unprotected, but you better not hurt her chil-
dren....”[14] One can discern Tymoshenko’s maternal attitude toward
the Ukrainian people in the greetings she has published on the occa-
sion of holidays (national, Christian, professional, etc.). The word
“warm” (as an adjective or as a verb) appears in many such congratu-
latory texts, e.g. “may the care of... people who love you warm your
hearts,”[15] “accept my warm greetings,”[16] “autumn brings us warm
recollections of light-hearted days,”[17] “may Easter... warm our souls
with blessed warmth,”[18] etc. (italics added). This verbal message is
usually supported by visually as in the 2002 posters and wall calen-
dars picturing Tymoshenko in a white warm sweater with the inscrip-
tion “May your next year be warm!”
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Indoor wall calendar / outdoor poster published and disseminated by BYuTy, Ukraine,
December 2002; inscription:
“May your next year be warm! Yulia Tymoshenko”
The notion of warmth in Ukrainian popular discourse is deeply asso-
ciated with a mother’s body, especially in conjunction with such
words as love, care, safety, good, and peace, which are often present
in Tymoshenko’s holiday greetings and her party’s ads.[19] The new
logo of Tymoshenko’s 2006 electoral campaign – a red heart against a
white background[20] – is a symbolic representation of the idea of
selfless and cordial maternal love. Maternal implications are often
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articulated in Tymoshenko’s rhetoric. For instance, she usually ad-
dressed people in her public speeches on Maydan Nezalezhnosti at the
time of the Orange Revolution in Kiev as “my kinsfolk.” A male
politician could be hardly imagined profitably using such rhetoric or
symbols to address his electorate in Ukraine.
Tymoshenko also behaves like a mother with her employees (her
secretary, chauffeur, etc.), and this behavior is understood in exactly
that way. Indeed, people put their impressions upon meeting Ty-
moshenko in almost the same words: “She always addresses them
with tender names; it seems to be warm family relations.”[21] People
seem to feel her warmth. On Tymoshenko’s personal website one can
find a letter from a certain Nadia, who shares her impressions of at-
tending a meeting with Tymoshenko in 2002: “[Tymoshenko] shines
with warmth and joy... she radiates energy... It was like a sunrise...Yulia
illuminated and warmed the souls... I felt warmed in my heart”[22] (ital-
ics added). Strikingly, three years later another female journalist
noted: “she radiates a powerful positive energy... she is blazing, and
that lightens, warms and cheers the people around her”[23] (italics
added).
As Joan Landes has noted, “Women are constituted as political
subjects in the new nation not only through the practice of mother-
hood but also in and through the complicated process of visual identi-
fication with iconic representations of virtue and nationalism.”[24]
Tymoshenko is a good example of this. The image of the Ukrainian
nation’s mother is visualized by means of her distinctive wrap-
around braid hairstyle.[25] In popular discourse such a hairstyle is
closely associated with the traditional image of mature woman, par-
ticularly a mother, i.e. Berehynia and her matriarchal implications.[26]
Adopting such a “new” look was an effective ploy. It not only helped
Tymoshenko to emphasize her political pro-Ukrainian-ness; it also
stressed her distinctiveness among Ukrainian politicians. The plait
makes Tymoshenko easily recognizable and presumably, the folk ori-
gin of this hairstyle resonate positively with traditionally oriented or-
dinary people.[27]
It was while she was a people’s deputy in Parliament that Ty-
moshenko began gradually softening her image. In 2004 she seldom
wore a plait, preferring slightly curled, loose and lightened hair in-
stead. In fall 2004, at the time of the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko
usually appeared on Maydan bareheaded, but she still showed up in
her trademark plait on official occasions. The plait became an object of
jest especially during and after the Orange Revolution. For example,
such mockery could be found in the summer 2005 on Lenin Square in
Donetsk, which is the permanent meeting place of Viktor
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Yanukovych partisans. They compared a plait with an evil tool en-
dangering Ukraine. In Russian the word kosa simultaneously means a
“plait” and a “scythe.” This play on words allowed an anonymous
author to call her “raw-boned with a scythe,”[28] i.e. the grim reaper.
The Narodnaya Opozitsiya bulletin published a caricature with Ty-
moshenko’s plait as a noose strangling the Ukrainian economy.
Another Ukrainian magazine featured a cover with a picture of snake-
like plaits coiling around Yushchenko.[29] Someone’s desire to wear a
hairstyle “à la Tymoshenko” was interpreted as one of the “orange
plague” symptoms in need of vaccinating against.[30] Such meta-
phors attach infernal implications to Tymoshenko’s image. Like any
Great Mother-Goddess in ancient myths, Tymoshenko’s image is es-
sentially ambivalent; via her plait it obtained its second – mortal –
representation in accordance with the basic principles of mythology.
In terms of ethnicity, Tymoshenko’s Ukrainianess is rather ques-
tionable. Her maiden name was Grygian, which is usually of Armeni-
an origin. Russian is her native language, and she spoke Russian most
of her life. In the late 1990s Tymoshenko was quite popular in the
Ukrainian southeast. But to become a national leader Tymoshenko
had to be recognized in the Ukrainian-speaking and nationally ori-
ented western regions as well. She knew that no Russian-speaking
politician had a chance to become popular in that region so she
learned Ukrainian, and since 2000 she has only spoken Ukrainian in
public. She thus won the favor of western Ukrainians, and they now
constitute the majority of her electorate.
Currently Tymoshenko’s team’s strategy is trying to secure her le-
gitimacy as the leader of the Ukrainian nation by establishing imagin-
ary ties with ancient Ukrainian history and culture. In 2005 the Lviv
regional branch of the Fatherland party started publishing a newspa-
per Nasha Batkivschyna (Our Fatherland). The golden Scythian neck-
piece – the invaluable ancient masterpiece of Ukraine – was chosen to
be its logo. “Just like this neckpiece Yulia is our most valuable treas-
ure and our national pride,” explained Mr. Semen, the vice-head of
the Fatherland Lviv regional branch. In an article entitled “The Herit-
age with Deep Roots,”[31] Bohdan Mykhaliunio discusses the histor-
ical continuity between this newspaper and various periodicals with
similar titles published by the Ukrainian national intelligentsia in the
Habsburg Empire and Poland in the nineteenth century. “Yulia Ty-
moshenko is the first woman since Princess Olga[32] to run the
Ukrainian government,” one could read in Tymoshenko’s pre-
electoral leaflet in 2006. Such historical references are intended to re-
inforce the impression of Tymoshenko’s “native” Ukrainian-ness.
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A NATIONAL HEROINE
Tymoshenko’s slender, delicate figure (she is less than 160 cm in
height and wears a size 38) belies her rather tough style of manage-
ment (because of which she has a reputation of being “the only man
in Ukrainian politics”). The mass media usually stress the contrast
between the immutable feminine loveliness of Tymoshenko’s appear-
ance and her enormous energy, lofty political ambitions, purposeful-
ness, resolution, and strong will, which are not usually associated
with traditional femininity.[33] The German magazine Focus elo-
quently named her an Iron Angel.[34] “There is a mighty Slavic tank
inside this Slavic figurine!” claimed a famous Ukrainian philosopher
and historian Vadym Skurativsky. “This is the unique combination of
a cool mind and a feminine charm! echoed another respected scholar,
Myroslav Popovych.[35]
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The combination of exterior delicacy and interior strength, femin-
ine appearance with masculine conduct, soft female sensibility with
tough male character makes Tymoshenko comparable to the French
heroine Joan of Arc, and the international mass media has not over-
looked this quite obvious similarity. In 2001 the Canadian Ukrainian
weekly Mist published a photo-collage portraying Joan of Act with
Tymoshenko’s head and the caption: “Recently the Canadian press
called Tymoshenko ‘the Ukrainian Joan of Arc.’” In the Ukrainian
nation-state milieu she is known as “the only Cossack among the
Ukrainian deputies.’[36] The image chosen for the cover of the satiric-
al novel Mister and Missis Yu in Country UA by Maria Matios (2006)
was of a woman in a wrap-around plait, vested in armor, in the
middle of a bonfire surrounded by Ukrainian men in traditional gar-
ments dancing the arkan battle dance.
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The cover of the book ‘Mr and Ms U in Country UA’ by Maria Matios (Kyiv, 2006)
In September 2006 the Ukrainian magazine Fokus designed its cover
with a portrait of Tymoshenko vested in armor a la Joan of Arc, and
“that pure personification of patriotism” remains Tymoshenko’s own
personal favorite heroine, as she confessed in 2005 to a journalist at Le
Monde.[38] As one might expect, Tymoshenko’s enemies have not
passed over this heroic image. On the contrary, they have turned it in-
to an object of black humor. One such joker asked: if “Yulia Ty-
moshenko is the Ukrainian Joan of Arc, when is she to be burned at
the stake?”[39]
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There are many variations in naming the militant femininity of
Yulia Tymoshenko: an Iron Lady, an Amazon, a Warrior Princess, a
Revolutionary Princess, the Ukrainian Marianne, and a Samurai in a
skirt[40] – these are just a few examples. As Marian Rubchak com-
mented, “the militancy that Tymoshenko has shown in battle to de-
fend herself and attack the government has been a route back to pub-
lic favor and, during the Orange Revolution, to the peak of her pop-
ularity.’[41] Although Tymoshenko constantly stresses her pacifism
(“Fighting someone is not my aim... Actually, I am a very peaceful
person...”[42]), her deeds reveal a disposition towards radical action.
After her dismissal nobody believed that she would fall into oblivion;
rather the Ukrainian media discussed her possible revenge and por-
trayed her as a warrior.[43] Tymoshenko does not avoid this aggress-
ive image. During the Orange Revolution Tymoshenko clambered up
on a truck blocking the way to the president’s residence and called
people to follow her example, and naturally she was then compared
with Delacroix’s famous painting “Liberty Leading the People.” In fall
2004 she often appeared in clothing that stressed her revolutionary
mood: her black leather jacket in the style of the Bolsheviks in 1917
and gaudy orange sweater with the inscription “revolution” spoke for
themselves. Finally, her 2006 electoral poster represented her as a rep-
resentative of the “Army of the Light” (from the popular blockbuster
Night Watch): Tymoshenko appears in an aureole dressed in a black
leather coat holding a sword. “Get out of the darkness everyone!” the
inscription says.
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Poster from the BYuTy parliamentary electoral campaign, Mar. 2006
Upon becoming leader of the opposition, Tymoshenko promised to
commit all her resources to fighting Ukraine’s inner enemies (namely
the oligarchy) and to rooting out corruption. “A sense of responsibil-
ity provides me with the strength to keep resisting. Moreover, there is
no power able to stop me,”[44] Tymoshenko claimed in 2001 when
under heavy attack. As Tymoshenko cannot but be aware of the mas-
culine coding of her tough behavior, one can conclude that she re-
gards it as indispensable for a successful political career, especially for
a politician in the opposition.
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A VICTIM / A MARTYR
The image of national heroine is occasionally transformed into a vari-
ation: that of victim or martyr, something which routinely took place
in 2001-2002 when Tymoshenko was persecuted the most. When she
was jailed in the course of the 2002 parliamentary electoral campaign,
flyers and a booklet picturing her as a victim of a corrupt regime ap-
peared immediately. Those pictures portrayed an ill, haggard and
tired-looking female martyr.
A sticker disseminated during Tymoshenko’s detention, spring 2001; inscription:
‘The regime’s brutality made me even stronger!’
A few years later, when she was suddenly discharged as Prime Minis-
ter, she came to the last session of her government in exactly the same
way. With shadows under the eyes and no make-up on her face, Ty-
moshenko looked tired, hurt and miserable, thus encouraging em-
pathy for her as the victim of an unfair and unequal struggle for
justice.
Tymoshenko’s political publicity countered the charges of crimes
attributed to her and described instead her numerous moral virtues as
a new people’s interests advocate. “The regime’s severity made me
even stronger” says one of Tymoshenko’s flyers in 2001. Tymoshen-
ko’s self-sacrificing dedication to her political vocation – namely the
Ukrainian nation’s better future – has been described in detail in the
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essay with a very eloquent title ‘Yulia Tymoshenko’s Crown of
Thorns.’[45] A detective story by Yuri Rogoza with the even more
provocative title The Unperformed Order came out at the same time.[46]
The novel relates a conspiracy of high-rank officials aimed at the
political assassination of Yulia Tymoshenko. In 2006 the same author
published a “non-documentary” novel (which is actually a sequel to
the previous one) under the more explicit title Killing Yulia.[47]
A novel ‘Killig Yulia’ by Yuriy Rogoza (Kyiv, 2006)
In both works the image of Tymoshenko as a victim-martyr is being
actively constructed, and verbal messages are reinforced by impress-
ive visual ones as the cover of the latter book features an overthrown
golden chess queen with a wrap-around braid which is bleeding on
the chess board.
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Political commentators have noted the use Tymoshenko has made
of the image of the victim-martyr in constructing her political image
as a fighter for the nation’s welfare,[48] and also the success that this
method has had on ordinary people.[49]
A political cartoon by Oleh Smal’, exhibited in Lviv in Dec. 2005
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchy) awarded
Tymoshenko an insignia of St. Barbara the Great Martyr in 1998, and
Tymoshenko wore this decoration on all official occasions up to her
imprisonment in 2001 and mobilized religious discourse in which she
figured as an envoy of God assigned to fight Evil, namely the regime
of a corrupt oligarchy:
Yes, I am a believer. All of my family members were believers, I mean, even
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. I believe in God and I feel Him intu-
itively, He is in my heart. I realize that my present-day struggle is a duel
between good and evil. A very difficult fight... We are the army of Good,
and we have to do all our best to win, even if we are crucified or killed for
that.[50]
Perhaps, Illia Panyok, a Ukrainian painter from Kharkiv, was inspired
by this rhetoric in deciding to create a monumental canvas titled
“Sacred Duel” picturing Yulia Tymoshenko in the role of St. George
defeating a dragon.[51]
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“Sacred Duel” painting by Illia Panyok, exhibited in Kyiv in Mar. 2007
A FAITHFUL CHRISTIAN
As clearly apparent in the previous example, the role of victim/mar-
tyr is closely related to the Christian virtue of self-sacrifice. It is not ac-
cidental that after the Orange Revolution Tymoshenko was deemed
the Goddess of the Orange Revolution,[52] the Icon of the Orange Re-
volution, and the Slavonic Madonna.[53] These monikers resulted
from the careful work and clever strategy of Tymoshenko’s team. She
is never as obvious in presenting her religious persuasions as most of
her fellow politicians.[54] Rather Tymoshenko’s image as a good
Christian is built from little details and remarks dispersed here and
there: “I am an Orthodox Christian, I do not believe in such symbolic
things [as horoscopes],” Tymoshenko stated in one interview.[55]
Elsewhere she went further: “I am really a believer. I communicate
with God every minute of my life, therefore everything I do I try to re-
concile with the moral principles of Decalogue.”[56]
For Tymoshenko Christianity is not only a personal affair – it is a
precondition of Ukraine’s welfare. Tymoshenko’s vision of Ukraine’s
future is heavily based upon Christian thought; it bears the imprint of
messianism, so the role of Yulia Tymoshenko in that utopia is rather
clear:
Currently I am writing a book about the ways human civilization has de-
veloped. That is why I study the Bible thoroughly. It says a lot about how to
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harmonize life... Faith is a way of life. Despite all of life’s severities, God says
‘Believe and do not fear’... I am confident that Ukraine’s vocation is to fulfill
its historical mission, namely to provide the world with a new example of a
rightful society.[57]
As a politician Tymoshenko understands and accepts the Christian di-
mension of her people’s mentality, so she has to fulfill their religious
aspirations. One of her biographers wrote: “Yulia Tymoshenko is an
earnest and faithful Christian. She claimed that ‘Ukraine will never
rise from its knees until it kneels to the God.’”[58] (bold in original).
In this context it is quite natural that Tymoshenko never forgets to
publish her congratulations to Ukrainian citizens on the occasions of
Christmas and Easter in the mass media.[59]
An Easter flyer printed and disseminated by the Lviv Regional Branch of Batkivshchyna,
Lviv, Spring 2005
The Lviv regional branch of Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party published
and distributed an Easter flyer in spring 2005 in which Tymoshenko’s
portrait appears side-by-side with a picture of traditional Ukrainian
Easter bread and symbols, religious congratulations and wishes. Thus
some additional national-religious meanings are injected into her
political image. And the action was clearly popular – one could find
flyers exposed on shop windows long after Easter (in June-August
2005).
The images on her personal website of Tymoshenko holding a
Christian icon, listening to a priest’s lesson, and praying in a church
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would also seem to reinforce her image as a proper Christian. Ty-
moshenko’s hairstyle strengthens not only the maternal (or matriarch-
al) implications of her image, but it bears a clear resemblance to the
Christian iconography as well. Some commentators have suggested
that her plait resembles a halo, and for many Tymoshenko looks like a
Christian icon.[60]
The idea of the divine in Tymoshenko’s image is not completely
unambiguous. One portrait of her, for example, in the local headquar-
ters of the Lviv regional branch of the Fatherland party, is situated on
the wall behind the desk of the Chief, a place of great honor that was
usually reserved for a Christian icon before socialism and for the por-
traits of Communist Party leaders (Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev etc.) in
Soviet times.
A portrait of Tymoshenko decorating the office of the Head of Lviv Regional Branch of the
‘Batkivshchyna’ Party, photo from Tymoshenko’s personal web-site www.tymoshenko.-
com.ua Oct. 30, 2003
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Tymoshenko’s portrait resembles the images of female prophets and/
or healers in Ukrainian newspaper advertisements: a straight-looking
gaze, a blessing/edifying shape to the hand, and a wraparound
purple plait/veil. Such a representation implies Tymoshenko’s ex-
traordinary spiritual potentialities. Another controversial image is
also reproduced on a Christmas poster (a wall calendar), which I
found in a hall in the headquarters. Tymoshenko appears as a fairy
able to fulfill dreams: “Make a wish!” the inscription says. The chil-
dren sledding in the background strengthen the effect of this omnipo-
tent mother-enchantress. Such a fusion of pagan and Christian ele-
ments in Tymoshenko’s image is quite natural inasmuch as it reflects
the syncretism of popular beliefs among Ukrainians, especially re-
garding the symbolic representation of femininity, as research by
Marian Rubchak has demonstrated.[61]
An indoor wall calendar printed by Lviv Regional Branch of the ‘Batkivshchyna’ Party,
Lviv, Dec. 2003
A STYLISH LADY
The aesthetic dimension is perhaps one of the most important aspects
of Tymoshenko’s image. It is true that ordinary Ukrainian people,
consciously or not, first started liking Tymoshenko for her beauty.
“She is such a pretty woman!” a middle-aged colleague of mine, an
advanced scholar and political activist, commented in explaining his
switch from another party to Fatherland. “The beautiful choice!” stated
a cover of the Korespondent magazine (#3, January 29, 2005) dedicated
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to Tymoshenko’s appointment to the post of Prime Minister. Even the
abbreviation of her party’s coalition name - Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko,
BYuTy is usually read as “beauty.”
So it was not surprising when a revolutionary poster/wall calen-
dar featured a smiling Tymoshenko offering flowers to the special
armed guard along with the slogan “Beauty will save the world!”
That slogan proved to be quite congruent with people’s expectations
regarding the mission of a woman in politics. It is also noteworthy
that the Russian version of the slogan could be read as “Beauty will
save the peace,”[62] which echoes the stereotypical perception of wo-
men as peacemakers. The slogan was replicated elsewhere (e.g. on
postcards), and the poster itself was used as a political banner at the
time of the Orange Revolution.[63] To defeat evil using the power of
beauty – is not that the Ukrainians’ expectations regarding the mis-
sion of a woman in politics?
Over the last years Tymoshenko gained fame as a fashion trend-
setter in Ukraine and abroad; her taste in clothing is almost beyond
question (despite the consensus that her style is rather eclectic). From
the very beginning of her political career people mentioned her pre-
disposition towards elegant, fashionable, quite expensive garments
and high-heeled shoes (one newspaper even nicknamed her “Yulia –
white shoes”[64]). Relatively recently, however, Tymoshenko has be-
come more trendy in her tastes. The changes to Tymoshenko’s entire
image over the last decade reflect the twists of her political career.[65]
These transformations resemble the stages of a butterfly’s transmuta-
tion: first, it has the shape of a regular caterpillar, then it turns into a
hard chrysalis, and finally a beautiful multicoloured being appears.
At the very beginning of her ascent onto political Olympus (in the
mid-nineties) Tymoshenko was merely a delicate, smiling woman
wearing light-coloured dresses and flowing hair, as photos from that
period show.[66] But in order to assert herself as a skilled gamer at
the political table, Tymoshenko had to change her image. She began
appearing as a serious businesswoman dressed in a dark tailored cas-
ual suit; her hairstyle changed as well – it became shorter and more
severely cut. At the beginning of 2001 Tymoshenko’s hair grew again,
and in fall 2001 she suddenly started wearing her signature wrap-
around plait, a rather courageous step since no Ukrainian politician
had ever changed his/her appearance (and the whole style) in such a
radical way before. The traditional hairstyle of a Ukrainian married
women betokened Tymoshenko’s political maturity; now she was a
ripe politician confident of her power. That was a sign that Ty-
moshenko was ready for an open fight.
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When Tymoshenko became Prime Minister at the beginning of
2005, she started paying particular attention to her appearance. Earlier
she claimed that black and white were her favorite colors of clothing,
but after she became a people’s deputy and especially after her ap-
pointment as Prime Minister, her clothing became significantly more
colorful. A number of dresses in red, pink, violet (let alone orange)
enriched her wardrobe. The mass media in Ukraine and abroad vied
with each other in discussing her appearance. Tymoshenko became
the main Ukrainian newsmaker not only because of her political and
governmental activities but also because of her garish garments, and
this is despite her statement of 2003 that “politicians cannot... walk in-
to Parliament as though on a catwalk. People should distinguish
between catwalk and Parliament, but whether one appears on cat-
walks or in politics, one should still look nice.”[67] Tymoshenko’s ap-
pearance broke all well-established dress codes. Indeed, the numer-
ous very womanish details of her dresses (artificial flowers, accordion
pleats, ruffles, puffed sleeves, etc.) are hardly associated with the re-
served business suits female politicians usually wear.
One might assume that Tymoshenko consults a professional
image-maker regarding garments, but in fact nobody has never heard
about or seen such a person.[68] Ayna Hase, Tymoshenko’s tailor,
claims: “She participates very actively in the creation of her garments.
I guess Yulia Volodymyrivna decides independently what to wear on
this or that occasion.”[69] As is typical of female decision-makers,
journalists pay much closer attention to Tymoshenko’s wardrobe than
to any of her male colleagues’.
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Newspapers’ publications discussing Tymoshenko’s appearance, 2005
In summer 2005, one newspaper celebrated Tymoshenko’s two hun-
dredth dress and devoted two pages to telling readers about her pref-
erences in clothing.[70] Another journalist spent a great deal of time
calculating how much Tymoshenko’s garments cost. Tymoshenko’s
enemies have also not passed over this issue in silence. They reinter-
preted her stylish image as a mask covering her (allegedly) corrupt,
criminal face. The following verse was published in a newspaper as-
sociated with the Ukrainian Progressive Socialist Party:
Yulia, please come in new clothing
High-heels pressing in the floor –
Interpol’s most ardent desire
is to embrace you and then ask for more.
You remember, in this season
Your best color is a hit
...Later in a women’s prison
You’ll be the leading zhensoviet.[71]
A SEXY WOMAN
In 2005, when Tymoshenko was at the peak of her career thus far, the
newspaper Argument Gazette published the results of a poll aimed at
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revealing how sexualized the images of Tymoshenko and Yushchen-
ko in popular opinion are.[72] Although the results are more than
modest (only about the quarter of male respondents like Tymoshenko
and less that 1% of them has related erotic fantasies[73]), the mere fact
of asking such questions is indicative.
It was in any case by no means the first time Tymoshenko has
been discussed as a sex symbol. In 2001 Tymoshenko was quoted as
remarking in passing that “appearing on the cover of Playboy
magazine is the best choice of any woman, but she herself does not fit
its standards.”[74] The media immediately labeled her a “new sex
symbol.” In December 2004 the men’s magazine FHM assigned Ty-
moshenko ninth position on a list of the world’s hundred sexiest wo-
men. In May 2005 the woman’s magazine ELLE Ukraine featured Ty-
moshenko on its cover and published an interview and a series of
photos of her in fashionable clothing. In June 2005 the Polish edition
of Playboy titled Tymoshenko “woman of the month” and published a
photo of her decently clothed. These examples provoked a real storm
in the media; only lazy people did not comment on them.[75]
The mass hysteria around Tymoshenko’s lure reached its peak in
autumn 2005 following her dismissal from the post of Prime Minister.
First, the premiere of the erotic movie Yulia took place in Moscow.[76]
As evident in the name, Yulia Tymoshenko was the most likely proto-
type for the main character, and, indeed, the young sexy girl, who of-
ten appears naked in very outspoken situations, bore a striking re-
semblance to a certain female Ukrainian politician with a wraparound
plait and the same name. Alexei Mitrofanov, a deputy in the Russian
Parliament, who produced and wrote the screenplay for this movie,
assumed that it would contribute to a rise in Tymoshenko’s ratings in
the course of the elections.[77] However, Tymoshenko’s opponents in
Ukraine tried to use her sexy image to compromise her. They printed
and disseminated in the city of Kirovohrad thousands of flyers pictur-
ing a bare-headed and naked Tymoshenko with inscriptions “Yulia,
we love you!” and “Why is your braid unplaited?”[78] Tymoshenko’s
female attributes give no rest to artists of all kinds. For instance,
Andrey Budayev, a Russian artist, created a series of paintings
(“Waiting for Eden,” “Abduction of Europa,” etc.) where Tymoshen-
ko appears naked in the role of a nymph (exhibited in Moscow in
January 2007); Alexander Lydahovsky, a Ukrainian artist, made a
bronze sculpture of Tymoshenko’s head (exhibited in Kyiv in March
2007); while a female painter from Saint-Petersburg, Vira Donska-
Khylko, created a monumental canvas “Rubliovsk Highway” on
which Tymoshenko appears naked in the company of twelve other
well-known women (mostly from show-business).[79]
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A COMPANION OR A DOLL
Tymoshenko’s appearance attracts people, especially men, and Ty-
moshenko herself is quite aware of it. She tested her powers in this re-
gard during a tense meeting with the Chief of Gazprom (the Russian
state gas enterprise), Rem Viakhirev, in 1995 by coming to a meeting
in a short skirt and jackboots, and won his favor. Later Tymoshenko’s
appearance caused many male officials confusion. Soon the media
started calling her Lady Yu[80] in analogy with Lady Di (Princess
Diana).
The perception of Tymoshenko’s striking appearance among her
male colleagues varies. Some interpret it as a manifestation of “her
ability to break stereotypes and to introduce innovations” in the polit-
ical realm (Yuri Kostenko); others are aware of the impact of her fem-
inine charm on male politicians but don’t mind: “inasmuch as it
works she may use it for Ukraine’s good” (Volodymyr Ya-
vorivsky);[81] “Men like her a lot. She knows that and uses her wo-
man’s advantages for political purposes”[82] (Alexander Holub). And
Tymoshenko has in fact admitted that she uses “female tricks” when
needed.[83]
Ukrainians are not accustomed to seeing a woman as an autonom-
ous and self-sufficient political agent. When she first began in politics,
Tymoshenko was often perceived as a protégé, and she worked hard
to allay this association. When she became a member of the opposi-
tion, people preferred to regard her as a partner or an assistant to the
male oppositional leaders. Experts of all kinds regard the pair
Yuschenko-Tymoshenko as exemplary of partnership in Ukrainian
politics. Socio-psychologists rate the tandem as very efficient and
strong because each partner complements and balances the individu-
ality of the other in terms of their masculine-feminine traits.[84] Their
teamwork was successful when Tymoshenko was Vice Prime Minister
in Yuschenko’s government in 2001; they also proved to be a good
team during the presidential campaign of 2004 and they continued to
cooperate as President and Prime Minister in 2005. They resemble a
mythical demiurge couple, in which male and female principles are in
perfect harmony. This allusion arises from both visual and verbal
messages. In December 2004 the newspaper Ukraina Moloda published
an article about Tymoshenko with the quite indicative title ‘The First
Lady of Revolution,”[85] although this title should refer to Kateryna
Chumachenko, Yuschenko’s wife.
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A political cartoon by Oleh Smal’, exhibited in Lviv in Dec. 2005
Pictures of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko together taken at a press
conference in September 2004 were reproduced and distributed as
postcards by the Lviv regional branch of Fatherland. In 2005 this tan-
dem inspired Alexander Roytburt to create a series of paintings de-
picting Tymoshenko and Yushchenko dancing several romantic ball-
dances together. The appearance of Yushchenko in portraits wearing
a wraparound plait à la Tymoshenko (e.g., a painting[86] and photo-
collage[87]) testifies to the monolithic public perception of the two
personages.
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‘I love Yu’ the painting by Natalia Kolumbet; reproduced on www.oboz.com
Of course, some prefer Tymoshenko to be a pretty doll with a
rather decorative function in an old boys’ game, namely politics.
Evidence of such an attitude is the unbelievably high prices paid by a
male money-bags for doll-like reproduction of Tymoshenko in March
2006 at a charity auction carried out by the elite women’s club
“Modus Vivendi,” where 13 papier-mâché replicates of Ukrainian
politicians made by Ukrainian artist Iryna Kirishyna quickly sold
out.[88] The “Yulia” doll, which resembled her prototype in detail,
was purchased for the highest price: $ 70 000![89] The new owner of
the Yulia doll was thrilled because, as he stated, “I can hold Yulia in
my hands now.”[90] This “doll” event was so successful that another
charity auction of dolls took place a few months later. At it, Ukrainian
politicians and other celebrities designed clothing and dressed up the
Barbie dolls with their own hands. As one would expect, the Barbie
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Yulia was again the most expensive. It was purchased for 19 000
Euro.[91]
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The doll copies of Yulia Tymoshenko sold out by auctions in Mar. and Jul. 2006
In such a context a logical question emerges: if a doll of Tymoshenko
can demand such a price, how much would high-ranking men pay to
handle the original?
It seems that the destiny of this prominent woman is to remain a
step behind a man. Some analysts prefer to regard this as a kind of
political tactic, something she first tried during the parliamentary
election of 1998 when she gave first place in the party’s list to Lazar-
enko. Thus she let him to run out of his political, moral and financial
resources while saving hers for the future.[92]
A BUSINESSWOMAN
It must be admitted that Tymoshenko also performs the role of busi-
nesswoman very well. She has repeatedly stressed that professional-
ism is a main virtue for any political leader and consistently made
professionalism her aim: “I am ready to devote my professionalism to
putting in good order the life of the nation,” Tymoshenko claimed in
2001,[93] repeating in 2002 “I never gave any cause for doubt in the
professionalism of my doings.”[94] This trait is indispensable for a
successful career for a female politician who, in addition to
everything else, has to overcome conservative gender stereotypes and
male chauvinism. Experts are unanimous in their opinion that
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Tymoshenko has been utterly efficient in every position she has
occupied.
Tymoshenko often underlines that she works a great deal in order
to get the best results in the shortest possible time. Therefore her
private life is reduced to a minimum, and her family members lack
her attention: “My family has suffered the most from my decision to
become a politician. This is my cruel payment for the right to fight for
my country.”[95] Her time for personal affairs is limited (she visits
her personal tailor at night[96]): “Today my life consists of three ele-
ments: 16 hours of work, a short sleep, and work again,”[97] she
stated at the time of her premiership. Her colleagues confirm that she
is an unusually hardworking person.[98] Her hard work (including
that aimed at the creation of her political image) has helped her attain
international recognition. For Tymoshenko’s achievements in 2005,
Forbes rated her among the most influential female politicians (in
third place on a list of a hundred).[99] In 2005 she gained a range of
international awards.[100] Even her political opponents cannot deny
her expertise.[101]
A FEMININE FEMINIST?
Feminine strategies in politics are hardly a new invention, but Yulia
Tymoshenko performs them very successfully and in practically a
pure form. The hyper-feminine style of her appearance is meant, first
of all, for the traditionally male component of her surroundings. It
works like a sugar pill, helping men to swallow all of her tough state-
ments and decisions. A paradigmatic example of such an effect was
the situation of Tymoshenko’s appointment to the post of Prime Min-
ister. As the majority of observers noted, she surpassed the utmost of
expectations in voting, and there was great speculation about the role
her overly feminine dress had played in it.[102]
The professionals in the fashion industry have also expressed
praise for Tymoshenko’s ability to remain a woman (at least out-
wardly) in such a highly masculine sphere as politics. Psychologists
see her as a person guided by intuition, which enabled her to sense
when to become more feminine.[103] One can easily notice how the
measure of femininity changes depending on the situation: her speech
during a session of government is rather tough – her voice with
metallic notes, an imperturbable expression on her face, whereas dur-
ing a personal TV interview or public meeting she speaks and smiles
softly, and uses politically correct and emotional turns of speech.
As Orysia Kulick has remarked, ‘The fact that Yulia Tymoshenko
feels the need to provide evidence of her femininity on her website
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with photographs of her serving food, gardening, and doing house-
work is a sign that she is either catering to an audience that expects
such behavior from her or that these ideas are so imbedded in Ukrain-
ian society that Tymoshenko expects this from herself.”[104] In one
interview she regretted not properly fulfilling her female role: “My
husband is the most patient man in the world. Currently I am not able
to create for him a tranquil family life as any wife could and has to
create for her husband... [Once] I was a very good housewife – [then] I
merely had no other option. I was always knitting, sewing
something...”[105] In 2005 she confessed that she “always feels happi-
est while with the family.”[106]
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The posters of the BYuTy parliamentary electoral campaign, Mar. 2006
However, Tymoshenko’s femininity is multifaceted. Despite the
fact that she is not young girl anymore, Tymoshenko is ready to ap-
pear as one in order to enlist support. Some posters in her 2006 elect-
oral campaign featured Tymoshenko riding a stylish motorcycle and
standing by a painted wall with a spray-can in hand. These portrayals
evoke an obvious association with youth subcultures (bikers and
graffiti-writers), ascribing to Tymoshenko such characteristics as in-
formality and open-mindedness, which are highly valued among
youthful voters.
It would be unfair to regard Tymoshenko as blind in terms of
gender issues. Some of her statements testify to her awareness of
gender inequality at least in the political realm: “Men accept defeat
from other men, but they hate to lose to women. So they fight women
harder than men. I am the best example of that.”[107] In general, Ty-
moshenko regards women as more efficient and more moral politi-
cians: “Historically female governors have provoked far fewer com-
plaints than men; the latter defiled world history with wars, violence
and betrayals.”[108] In only one of Tymoshenko’s interviews (namely
that conducted by Liudmyla Taran, a feminist journalist) has she re-
vealed her reflections on gender issues in a global perspective.[109]
This rare avowal deserves to be quoted here:
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The previous stage of the development of civilization has created a certain
image of man, since society first needed physical muscular force. Over a
long period men determined the human race’s destiny... Over millennia men
implemented their worldview and ideas. It resulted in the obvious danger of
civilization’s self-destruction. Men have used their chance while exploiting
women’s energy in their affairs, keeping women in secondary roles...
As civilization has developed, there is no more need in men’s physical
strength, so women have come to the fore... Today when world injustice has
transgressed all possible limits, a women’s vocation is to bring some har-
mony to it... Women have to assume power at all levels... The task is to build
the world on the principles of harmony and justice... Men will violently res-
ist the women’s movement, so women have to rely on their own strength.
No illusions! Women have to help each other and to develop solidarity. We
have to overcome the barriers which mentally separate us... Women [should
start] supporting worthy female candidates who run for Parliament or for
positions in local government...
After such claims one may define Tymoshenko as a feminist, espe-
cially taking into consideration her lifestyle. But Tymoshenko herself
would never admit to such a definition. Many times she has publicly
repudiated associations with women’s (let alone feminist) move-
ments, and this despite the fact that when she was imprisoned in 2001
some women’s organizations publicly supported her. Her call for wo-
men’s solidarity would seem to be very hollow, or another role per-
formed upon request. Tymoshenko does not regard herself as a rep-
resentative of women’s interests in politics. The parliamentary frac-
tion of her parties’ bloc BYuTy voted against a bill for a women’s
quota in Parliament in late 2003. It did not support the first reading of
a bill on gender equality in January 2005 either.[110]
Tymoshenko seems to have no idea (at least until recently) about
the goals and objectives of the women’s movement; nor does she
seem to understand the meaning of International Women’s Day
(March 8th). Annually she publishes congratulations on this occasion
full of stereotypical perception of women’s roles – just as her male col-
leagues usually do. One such message is very eloquent in this sense:
Spring gives us a holiday of tenderness and love. The first flowers open the
way to beauty, awaking the most sentimental feelings and new hopes. Wo-
man’s beauty blossoms on this holiday. My dear, darling mothers, grand-
mothers, sisters and daughters! Congratulations on the occasion of this won-
derful day of beauty and love...[111]
On the one hand, Tymoshenko is aware that “successful self-
fulfilment in politics is possible only for women who do not comply
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with the Ukrainian stereotype of Berehynia, namely a woman-mother
in an embroidered chemise singing lullabies.”[112] On the other hand,
she displays her virtuosity in handling the variety of stereotypical im-
ages of femininity. Is this not a part she deliberately plays in a great
performance, namely “Ukrainian politics”? Is this not necessary mim-
icry in a society with very traditional expectations about gender roles?
Indeed, it seems to me that Tymoshenko is just pretending to be a ste-
reotypical woman. She wears a range of tried-and-true feminine cam-
ouflage and uses her female “armor” to neutralize rivals, to capture
enemies and to recruit allies. How far can she go in this regard? One
can only hope that Tymoshenko’s feminist awareness will attain ma-
turity before her feminine tactics run out of resources.
“Feminism is a quite good instrument to call things by their prop-
er name,” Solomea Pavlychko, the famous pioneer of feminist thought
in Ukraine, stated in an interview in 1998.[113] “I try to call things by
their proper name,”[114] Yulia Tymoshenko concluded in her inter-
view with a feminist journalist in 2002. Perhaps it was not a random
coincidence, but rather an intuitive, spontaneous or unconscious dis-
cursive coherence of feminist thought in two outstanding women.
SUMMARY
During the 1990s two ideologies impacted public discourse in
Ukraine: formerly forbidden Ukrainian nationalism and formerly un-
known consumer culture. These two have generated and helped two
corresponding models of femininity for Ukrainian women (Berehynia
and Barbie) to take root. Monitoring the political career of the most
prominent Ukrainian female politician, Yulia Tymoshenko, has re-
vealed some quite remarkable changes in her political image, espe-
cially in her appearance and rhetoric, which correspond with different
stages of Tymoshenko’s ascent up to the summit of Ukrainian politics.
This paper has explored a range of representations of Tymoshenko,
including the photo album on her personal website, as well as other
visual materials like posters, flyers, paintings, etc., her verbal mes-
sages (public speeches, interviews, etc.) as well as a number of mass
media publications about her, in order to reveal how Tymoshenko has
constructed and used stereotypical women’s images (including such
core elements as Mother of the Nation, National Heroine, Victim/
Martyr, Faithful Christian, Fashionable Lady, Sexy Woman, and Busi-
nesswoman). Both the opinions of Tymoshenko’s followers and the
reactions of her opponents have been examined. The clash and confu-
sion of feminist and feminine modes in Tymoshenko’s political
strategies have been noted as well.
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NOTES
[1] The author witnessed this event.
[2] All translations, from both Ukrainian and Russian, are by the author.
[3] It’s very remarkable that the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko spent almost half the
amount on its electoral campaign and gained almost double the votes that
Yuschenko’s parties’ bloc Nasha Ukraina did.
[4] Certainly other models of femininity exist in Ukraine as well, such as the busi-
nesswoman and the feminist, but they are rather concealed in Ukrainian pub-
lic discourse. For a discussion of the promotion of Berehynia and Barbie im-
ages in academic, public and political discourses, see Oksana Kis, “Choosing
without Choice: Predominant Models of Femininity in Contemporary
Ukraine.” Gender Transitions in Russia and Eastern Europe. Eds. Ildiko Asztalos
Morell, Helen Carlback, Madeleine Hurd, Sara Rastback. Stockholm: Gon-
dolin Publishers, 2005. 105-36.
[5] For a more comprehensive discussion of the fusion of the two images – the
Christian Virgin Mary and the pagan (pseudo)goddess Berehynia – in the
process of elaborating a new national model of femininity in Ukraine, see
Marian Rubchak, “Christian Virgin or Pagan Goddess: Feminism versus the
Eternally Feminine in Ukraine.” Women in Russia and Ukraine. Ed. Rosalind
Marsh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 320.
[6] For Yulia Tymoshenko’s autobiography, see <http://www.tymoshenko.-
com.ua>; for a detailed account of all the stages and aspects of Tymoshenko’s
biography and personality, see Andriy Kokotyukha ed., Yulia. Kharkiv: Folio,
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2006 (in Ukrainian); Dmitriy Popov and Ilya Milhtein, Oranzhevaya Printsessa.
Zagadka Yulii Timoshenko. Moscow: Morozova Publishing, 2006 (in Russian).
[7] What is more, the groom was one year younger than the bride, which is tradi-
tionally regarded as an undesirable match.
[8] Tymoshenko started her political career in the Hromada (Community) party led
by Lazarenko; he lobbied for her business interests (and protected her United
Energy Systems) in the Ukrainian government.
[9] For details of her political program, see Tymoshenko’s personal website
http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua.
[10] Her statements about the compulsory seizing of dozens of huge private enter-
prises (so-called “re-privatization”) in the spring of 2005 followed by an at-
tempt by the government to directly regulate market prices for gasoline,
meat, and sugar were the subjects of criticism in this respect.
[11] Andrey Slivka, “Bitter Orange.” The New York Times Magazine 1 Jan. 2006: 27.
[12] To track the changes in Tymoshenko’s appearance, see her extensive photo al-
bum on her personal website: http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua.
[13] In an interview for the radio station Hromadske Radio (Public Radio), given on
January 24, 2003; the full transcript is published at http://www.tymoshen-
ko.com.ua/ukr/news/press/1096/.
[14] “Yulia Tymoshenko: Medvedchuk, Yanukovych, Pinchuk I Surkis budut prat-
siuvaty v opozytsii”. 14 Oct. 2003 <http://www.glavred.com>
[15] “Pryvitannia Yulii Tymoshenko zi sviatom vesny - 8 bereznia” 6 Mar. 2002
<http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua/ukr/news/first/606>
[16] “Zi sviatom, dorohi seliany!” 15 Nov. 2002 <http://www.tymoshenko.-
com.ua/ukr/news/first/1059>
[17] “Zi sviatom vas, dorohi osvitiany!” 4 Oct. 2002 <http://www.tymoshenko.-
com.ua/ukr/news/first/1031/>
[18] “Slovo do viruyuchykh naperedodni Velykodnia” 25 Apr. 2003 <ht-
tp://www.tymoshenko.com.ua/ukr/news/first/1146/>
[19] Interesting enough, Tymoshenko chose only three professions as worthy of her
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